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1INTRODUCTION
The structure of agricultural production in Zimbabwe is characterized by the existence of 
three distinct types of land tenure and farming systems. Large scale commercial farming 
areas occupy 39 percent of the land and comprise extensive holdings under an individual 
freehold system, with an average holding size of 3 000 hectares. Small scale commercial 
farming areas account for 4 percent of total land area and consist of 110 000 smallholder 
farms of 80 to 200 hectares, also under a freehold system. Resettlement areas, 
introduced in 1980 to reallocate land formerly in the large scale commercial sector, also 
occupy 4 percent of the land. The government holds title to this land and extends 
annually renewable permits to settlers. The communal areas cover 42 percent of the land 
and carter for about 55 percent of the population on individual arable holdings of between 
on average 2 to 4 hectares. There are vast differences in land holding size. Key 
resources such as grazing, forests, and forest products and water are communally held 
(Murombedzi, 1990).
In this paper we are concerned only with the communal tenure system with particular 
reference to overgrazing in the communal areas. Evidence from many sources indicate 
that the communal area rangelands are overgrazed and hence degraded (Chigaru 1984; 
Ndlovu 1990; Clatworthy et. al. 1985; Rukuni 1985; Murombedzi 1990) and there is 
immediate heed to formulate policies that will enable efficient and sustainable grazing 
use. Hence the purpose of this paper is to suggest policies that can be used for effective 
communal area grazing management and their implications on efficiency, sustainability, 
equity, and food security.,
1. THE CAUSES OF GRAZING LAND DEGRADATION IN THE COMMUNAL 
AREAS
This section gives a historical overview of the problem of communal area grazing 
mismanagement, current government policies concerning the livestock sector and the 
current role of livestock in the communal areas and how each of these contribute to the 
continued degradation of the grazing areas.
1.1 A Historical Overview of the Grazing Land Degradation
The misinterpretation of the basic causes of resource degradation has led to the 
prescription of inappropriate solutions in the past. Persistent overgrazing, especially by 
domestic livestock, and in particular cattle, in combination with 'incorrect husbandry 
practices', have allegedly impoverished extensive areas of the communal areas. This 
situation has led to serious soil loss and to the siltation of rivers and dams. The same 
processes are said to be solely responsible for heavy stock and wildlife losses, 
particularly in drought years (Murombedzi 1990). '
2This phenomena of land degradation due to  overgrazing and the expansion of arable 
agriculture into previously designated grazing land, dates back to the creation of the 
Reserves and the concentration of people on marginal land. Due to increases in taxes 
and falling grain prices, smallholder farmers were forced to increase land under cultivation 
during the early 1920s. By the end of the 1920s, this process had reached its peak and it 
was reported that the number of cattle in the Reserves was becoming too large and so 
much land was put under cultivation (Murobedzi, 1990).
In the 1930s the, colonial government started paying attention to the conservation 
problems of the Reserves. The colonial government saw the crisis of land or grazing 
degradation in terms of.bad African methods of land preparation - use of the plough, and 
opening up of new land by the well-off class of plough owning farmers. Peasants saw it 
as a crisis brought about by low prices, government intervention in marketing and the 
increasing diversion of labor into conservation works. According to the then government 
the policy solution was centralization1 which was meant to oust this new entrepreneurial 
class and eventually to drive them out of the Reserve system altogether (Ranger 1985).
After the end of World War II, colonial agriculture in Zimbabwe became a profitable 
venture. This necessitated the implementation of Land Tenure Act (LTA) and led to mass 
eviction of African 'squatters' from European land unless they entered into labor 
agreements with the white farmers. The result was a dramatic increase in the human and 
livestock population of the Reserves and a concomitant and inevitable rise in the rate and 
extent of resource degradation in the Reserves. The NHLA with its provisions for 
intensive conservation works: drain strips, gully dams, contour ridges, rotational grazing 
etc, was introduced against this background.
Government attempts to undermine large rural entrepreneurs continued with the 
promulgation of the Native Land Husbandry Act (NLHA) in 1951. This act is often 
regarded as having introduced the potential for capital accumulation in the Reserves by 
providing individual tenure. However, its implementation had the effect of equalization of 
land holdings. The conservation measures of the NLHA were resisted by the smallholder 
farmers because it meant taking out of production land that was already not enough to 
guarantee even subsistence needs and farmers would spend most of their time attending 
to conservation works. The most important reason farmers resisted the NLHA act was
Originally conceded as a measure by which a division was made between 
exclusively arable and exclusively grazing land, centralization became 
a means of redistribution of land in the reserves.
3that it required them to limit livestock numbers so as to curb overgrazing (Cliffe 1986).
In the early 1970s a policy of community development was conceived in which the state 
gave recognition to some of the institutional realities, particularly the role of chiefs, while 
still attempting to achieve the technical and economic objectives of the NLHA. These 
ideas were incorporated in the LTA of 1970 which gave legal recognition to what became 
known as the Tribal Land Authorities in communal areas or the Tribal Trust Land. The 
grazing schemes of the early 1970s were a direct result of this policy (Tawonezvi and 
Zindi 1994). The perceived benefits from the setting up of grazing schemes included 
improved livestock production leading to better calving rates, improved animal offtake 
arising from increased numbers as well as better veld management and reduced 
degradation, improved access to draught power, decreased labor requirements for 
herding and increase availability of labor for other farming operations (Cousins 1988). 
The grazing schemes were also expected to reduce the risk of irreversible environmental 
degradation as a result of perceived overgrazing and poor management.
Grazing land degradation in the communal areas was due to arable expansion brought 
about by inappropriate pricing policies and the colonial administration perception of the 
problem as being essentially a tenure problem, and their failure to prescribe solutions, i.e 
land redistribution. Arable expansion into grazing areas has continued almost unabated 
in post-colonial Zimbabwe. The resettlement programme, having managed to settle only 
40 000 households out of the targeted 162 000 by 1984 has obviously not significantly 
relieved land pressure in the communal areas especially when one considers that 
employment in the non-agricultural sector has not increased at all while the population 
has grown at an annual rate of around 2.9 percent (Tawonezvi and Zindi 1994).
Proposing an economic cost and benefit analysis for arable expansion into grazing, 
Scoones and Wilson (1989) observe that such expansion has tended to be more rapid in 
the overpopulated high potential areas in NRs II and III, and in areas of spontaneous 
resettlement in the north (the Zambezi Valley). In these areas, returns on opening up of 
arable land will probably remain higher than the costs of reduced grazing.
1.2 Current Government Livestock Policy
The current livestock development policy is largely a continuation of policies initiated 
since the 1920s. The assumptions, underlying these policies as well as the prescriptions 
proposed to the perceived problems, have shown similar continuity. First, the livestock 
production in communal areas is seen in terms of milkand meat production. To this end 
the encouragement of small ruminant goes hand in hand with farmers objectives for 
increased meat production as well as milk from cattle. The Policy Statement (MLAW,
1993) argues, that improvement in . the efficiency of livestock production will lead to 
improved offtake rates and levels of income. Among other things, this is expected to be 
achieved by conservation of rangeland, control of livestock numbers and stocking rates, 
promotion of grazing schemes, and increased offtake rates encouraging cattle sales. 
How the conservation of the rangeland and control of livestock numbers and stocking 
rates are to be achieved is not spelled out.
The government objectives of increasing cattle off-take from the communal areas is in 
direct conflict with farmers' objectives. Steinfeld (1988) makes it clear that communal 
area farmers are not interested in reducing their cattle numbers by selling because they 
regard cattle as an investment. When their external value (market value) rises farmers 
regard this as an additional security as well as a form of increased wealth. It is therefore 
surprising that while the policy document acknowledges the functions of cattle based on 
recent research, and recognizes the low levels of output from the communal sector, it 
proposes to consider increased offtake from cattle as an important thrust.
Secondly, another view which has been increasingly advocated is the one which sees the 
communal tenure system as the major constraint to sustainable livestock, production. The 
rangeland is a common property resource with the right to its exploitation held by all 
members of a loosely defined community. It is argued that lack of accountability, on the 
grazing resource in traditional communal rangeland has resulted in lack of commitment to 
improve grazing areas and its water resources. This in turn have led to mismanagement, 
land degradation and, consequently, poor livestock productivity (LDP 1992). While the 
policy paper recognizes this problem of common property management, it only highlights 
the formation of grazing schemes and efficient use of the available livestock feed - mainly 
crop residues as the possible solutions to curbing the degradation of grazing areas. The 
policy document does not indicate how the problem of open access with a community can 
be resolved to ensure efficient and sustainable use of the range. In this paper we 
suggest possible policies that can be implemented or adopted to ease range degradation 
whilst at the same time satisfying the farmers objectives of keeping livestock for crop 
production, store of wealth, milk and offtake for sales or subsistence.
1.3 Trends In Livestock and Human Population
The livestock (this includes cattle, goats, sheep and pigs) numbers in the communal 
areas dramatically increased from 1.8 million in 1965 to 3.4 million in 1977, an increase of 
approximately 80 percent (Chigaru 1984). After stagnating in the late 1970s, the 
communal cattle herd has increased from approximately 2.9 million head at 
independence to approximately 4.4 million head in 1991, indicating an average annual 
growth rate of 3 percent (MLAWD 1993). During the period 1980 to 1990, the goat flock
5increased from 0.982 million to 2.6 million and that of sheep from 0.387 million to 0.6 
million (MLAWD 1993).
This increase in livestock numbers'went hand in hand with an increase in the human 
population, without concomitant changes in the size of available land. The trend, has 
been one of increasing cattle numbers and decreasing grazing resources as a result of 
increased cropping to satisfy the food needs of a rapidly expanding "peasant" population. 
However fluctuations were experienced primarily due to droughts. It is estimated that the 
size of the communal herd fell by 31 percent due to the 1991/92 drought (Tawonezvi and 
Zindi 1994). In many areas of the country, human and livestock numbers are greatly in 
excess of carrying capacity of these areas (Table 1).
Nearly 75 percent of the communal lands lie in the NRs IV and V which are ill-suited to 
dry land cropping. At iow population pressures, even land, of ./low.,potential can be 
managed productively, using existing farming practices. However, as Table 1 shows, all 
but a third of the communal lands have human and population pressure in excess of their 
current carrying capacity. This population pressure is excessive in some 40 percent of 
the communal areas. The existing farming systems currently followed in large areas of 
Zimbabwe are simpiy not sustainable at today's human and livestock population levels 
(Blackie 1982).
Table 1: Population pressure in relation to carrying capacity
Pressure class 
Balanced or none
2 times - some
3 times - great
4 times - extreme
5 times - desperate
Proportion of communal lands(%)
32.7
29.8
12.9 
11.7
12.9
Source: Whitlow J.R 1980, "Environmental Constraints and Population Pressures 
in the Tribal Areas of Zimbabwe", Zimbabwe Agric. J., 77. 4: 173-181: in Blackie 
(1982)
The increase in livestock numbers is due to the multiple'roles livestock play in the 
communal areas - draught power, manure, milk and social functions. Due to the multiple 
roles of cattle, low off-take rates resulted. In turn the iow offtake rates results in increased 
overgrazing during the dry and drought seasons.
2. THEORY OF GRAZING LAND MISMANAGEMENT
This section of the paper briefly discusses the theory of grazing land mismanagement.
62.1 The Issue of Properly Rights
Property rights are the set of entitlements which define the privileges, obligations and 
limitations governing the use of resources by individuals and groups of individuals. To 
secure an optimal allocation of resources in a market economy, there is need for efficient 
property rights. Four conditions define an efficient structure of property rights (Tietenberg, 
1988):
1. Universality: All resources are privately owned and all entitlements completely 
specified. This is to avoid situations in which competing claims and conflicts may 
cause uncertainty of ownership and discourage investment in the sustainable use 
of natural resources.
2. Exclusivity: All benefits and costs (including positive and negative externalities) 
from owning and using the resource should accrue, either directly or indirectly, 
solely to the owner. Multiple ownership may undermine incentives to invest in a 
resource, particularly when the number of owners is high.
3. '  Transferability: property rights should be transferable from one owner to another.
If rights over resources are not transferable, long term investments may be 
discouraged because owners cannot profit from such investment in case of a 
change in ownership.
4. Enforceability: Property rights should be secure from involuntary seizure .or
encroachment by others. Where challenge to ownership, risk of expropriation or 
high political and economic instability occur, private initiatives to manage resources 
may be undermined.
Given these characteristics of well defined property rights, tenure systems in relation to 
grazing lands can be grouped into four: freehold, leasehold, communal and open access.
In classical economics private ownership with well defined property rights, has as a goal 
profit maximization. ..ignoring discounting, and not taking into account the .environmental 
damage done by grazing cattle as well as grazing costs, the individual owners would keep 
CT1 cattle (Figure 1). If property rights are well defined and externalities are internalized, 
i.e. the private owners pay for environmental damage, they will only graze CT2 cattle.
7Another tenure type is common property regime. Common property regimes are not a 
free-for-all but are structured ownership arrangements within which management rules 
are developed, group size is known and enforced and incentives exist for co-owners to 
follow the accepted institutional arrangements (Bromley and Cernea, 1989). Thus with 
common property regimes, resources can be managed efficiently, to almost the same 
extent as grazing under the free hold tenure system.
Grazing resource degradation in the communal area has been incorrectly attributed to 
"common property systems", when it actually originates from lack of well defined property 
rights and lack of local-level institutional arrangements. This situation is an open access 
tenurial system, which is discussed below.
2.2 Open Access as an explanation for Overgrazing _____  ________
In Zimbabwe, when the livestock and human populations were- low, there were no 
problems of overgrazing and environmental degradation. As both the livestock and 
human populations increased to more than the carrying capacity of the environment in the 
communal areas, grazing land has become a scarce resource. The non-development of 
property rights led to the open access.
With open access, - no one exercises control over the grazing resources. In the 
communal areas communities can exclude other communities from using their grazing 
resources. Since the property rights to grazing lands are not conveyed to any single
8farmer within a community, no single farmer can exclude others from exploiting the 
grazing lands.
The effect of lack of property rights and hence open access are illustrated in Figure 1. 
Hardin (1968) has succinctly summarized the decisions facing an individual cattle owner 
using a communal pasture. The rational herdsman seeks to maximize his. own utility. 
Each additional animal he grazes adds, say, one unit of utility since he gains additional 
revenue from the use of that animal. This same animal, by increasing grazing pressure, 
also detracts from his utility. But since the extra effect of the overgrazing caused by a 
single beast is small and overgrazing is shared amongst all grazers, the disutility effect is 
small: The net effect, under existing arrangements, is that the only way a herdsman can 
improve his utility is by increasing his cattle holdings. Combine this fact with the very real 
gains in capital value associated with owning cattle and it is no wonder that most of 
Zimbabwe's communal lands are critically overgrazed. In this case without well defined 
property rights the number of cattle kept and grazed is at the level CT3. This means the 
individual farmer has an incentive to expend further effort until profit is zero2. If farmers 
are made to pay for the cost of grazing and environmental damage caused by keeping 
cattle (through taxes for example), say the difference between MC1 and MC2 in Figure 1, 
.they would graze only CT2 cattle in each time period.
3. OBJECTIVES OF POLICY AND POLICY OPTIONS FOR MANAGEMENT OF 
COMMUNAL AREA GRAZING
This section presents the possible policy options that can be used to enable efficient 
and/or sustainable use grazing lands in communal areas. Where possible the limitations 
of each policy option are discussed.
3.1 Defining Policy Objectives
Before presenting the possible policy options for grazing land management, the 
objectives of policy that are considered relevant for this paper are presented. These are 
efficiency, sustainability, equity, and food security. A brief outline of the meaning 
attached to each policy objective is given below.
3.1.1 Efficiency
Efficiency means the allocation of scarce resources to those competing uses that yield 
the maximum net benefits according to societal preferences. These preferences are 
usually revealed by prices through the market in the form of demand for goods and 
services. In the case of grazing, the greater the demand, the higher the market price for 
grazing. A perfectly functioning free market for grazing would provide an economically 
efficient use of grazing lands. This is static efficiency and would be Pareto Optimal at the 
given income distribution.
Let £(:■:) be the value of cattle output produced if there were r cattle grazed 
under open access. Current output per cattle is therefore £ ( > : ) / z .  
When an individual contemplates adding, say, an ox, total output 
becomes f  (y. + l )  and number of cattle (z + 1 ) .  Revenue generated by one ox 
for the individual is f  (y. + l )  /  (z-t 1 ) = AP. The individual farmer then 
compares this revenue with MCI. If f  ( x + 1 ) /  (z + 1)  > MCI it is profitable 
to add an ox to one's herd since the value of output exceeds the cost.
Hence the individual will choose to graze cattle until one AF o: one 
ox is driven to MCI and CT3 cattle are grazed!
9Whilst static efficiency is the allocation which maximizes the net benefits in every period, 
■dynamic efficiency involves maximizing the net present value (NPV) of use of scarce 
resources among the alternative resource uses over time. Dynamic efficiency also 
includes the multiplier effects over time and is usually broadly defined throughout the 
economy. For example, with well defined property rights, degradation of the veld will be 
reduced, as well as soil erosion and river siltation. The reduced siltation has implications 
on availability of water for irrigation and household uses, fish catch if there is any fishing 
in the area etc. -  — --  --------  ---..................
3.1.2 Equity
Equity is concerned with fairness of resource distribution. Hence it inevitably involves 
political and value judgements. There is a . potential trade-off between equity and 
efficiency. To achieve greater equity, some amount of efficiency may have to be 
sacrificed. However, depending on the type of environmental problem to be solved, 
efficiency and equity can be complementary. For example, in terms of grazing in the 
communal areas, by allocating property rights to the presently open access situation may 
serve efficiency and equity objectives simultaneously.. This is achieved by making the 
best use of the grazing lands and, with careful implementation, some of the gains can be 
channelled to non-cattle owners.
3.1.3 Sustainability
Maintaining long term grazing land productivity by preventing overgrazing implies a 
sustainable use of grazing land. Sustainability implies the use of the grazing resources 
without compromising-future generations. The sustainability principle does not apply only 
to non-renewable resources but also to renewable resources. If the rate of harvesting of 
the renewable resource is faster than the rate of regeneration, then that resource can not 
be sustainably utilized.
Since the renewable resources are used over time, there is need to discount the net 
benefits realized from the use of those resources. But by discounting, more value is 
placed on the grazing resources today and less value on the resources in the future. The 
higher the discount rate used in calculating the NPV implies more of the resources that 
are available are used today than in the future as this maximizes the NPV. Hence 
sustainability is not achieved since there will be less of the grazing resources for the 
future generation than there are for the present generation.
3.1.4 Food security
Food security means the availability and access to food by a household to lead an active 
normal life. Food is available by producing or importing and one has access to food 
through own production or by purchasing. In this paper food security refers to rural 
household food security rather than to urban household food security.------------— ------------
3.2 Policy Options for Grazing Management in Zimbabwe
3.2.1 The Allocation of Grazing Rights (Quota System)
Reynolds (1981) has advocated the use of the share concept to enable communities to 
manage communal resources such as grazing land. It serves to separate communal 
interest in the improvement of grazing from the interest of the individual in using that 
grazing. Each member of the community would be allocated a grazing 'share' which
would be the right to graze some number of livestock units. The total number of livestock 
units permitted would equal the locally determined carrying capacity. The individual 
shareholder has a limited but guaranteed right of access to the grazing. Should he 
possess insufficient livestock, this right can be sold/leased on an annual basis to other 
community members whose cattle exceed their quotas. A price for grazing, which does 
not exist under traditional arrangements is established and it is the difference between the 
MC1 and the MC2 curve in Figure I. With encroachment on to the grazing lands, this 
means the grazing rights per household would be reduced and the difference between 
MC1 and MC2 is increased. .... "
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3.2.1.1 Efficiency implications
The carrying capacity of community grazing lands is determined annually by the group 
with the help of extension personnel. Probably this would take place in the interval after 
the rains, and before the flush of new births. In bad years, the carrying capacity would be 
revised downwards and thus the price of grazing wouid rise3. Should the community 
under- or overestimate the carrying capacity in one year, this can simply be adjusted in 
future periods. The system guides the community into the efficient use of grazing.
In terms of dynamic efficiency, veld degradation will be reduced resulting in reduced 
siltation which has a positive impact on irrigation, availability of water for domestic and 
livestock use and on fisheries, if there is any fishing in the area.
3.2.1.2 Equity implications
The procedure of giving grazing rights to households or individuals, allows those who own 
few or no livestock to receive compensation for not grazing the common land from those 
"wealthier" individuals who hold stock in excess of their share. The fact that the lease of 
grazing rights to the "wealthy" households is done on an annual basis means the poor 
households would have a flow of income from year to year.
3.2.1.3 Sustainability implications '
As long as the society sticks to the recommended stocking rates for each individual year, 
the policy of grazing rights is sustainable since the problem of overgrazing will be no 
more. Even if the community continues to encroach onto grazing land, the difference 
between MC1 and MC2 may increase to a level that may hinder farmers from increasing 
their herd sizes. The consequence is the biomass yield of the veld will not go beyond 
minimum viable total veid biomass below which the veld would not be able to regenerate. 
In this way there will veld for future generations as is available to the present generation 
of farmers.
3.2.1.4 Food security implications
A priori, the effects of allocating grazing rights on food security cannot be stated. On one., 
hand, due to improvements in veld management, milk production and draught output will 
increase and hence the food security at the rural community level will increase. The 
major beneficiaries will be the cattle owners and the secondary beneficiaries will be the 
non-cattle owners. The non-livestock .owners may benefit indirectly from resulting low 
milk prices and early ploughing of their fields. On the other hand, due to de-stocking
In the form of ae-stocking or high grating prices.
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there will be less draught power and manure availability and this would have a negative 
impact on food security.
Poor households would have money from their share sales/rental and this will increase 
food security.
For this policy, the impact on food security depends on whether the increased draught 
power calving and milk production due to the improved veld, outweighs the effect of more 
animals without veld improvement. ------  -- --------
3.2.1.5 Problems in implementing the grazing quota policy
First, the question that is posed is who should be considered when distributing grazing 
shares? Is it the household or individuals within the household? This is an important 
question that must be addressed first because livestock ownership is not at the 
household level but it is by individuals in the household.
Secondly, which authority enforces grazing rights and duties is a critical variable. The 
options are: the state, the community, or the community backed by the state. The type of 
authority will determine the by-laws that , has to be adopted to ensure that the 
recommended stocking rates are observed.
Third, owners with large cattle herds will protest against paying. During a survey of 
grazing schemes Cousins (1987) got the following responses from livestock owners 
concerning share grazing:
a. Finding money to pay will not be easy
b. Accumulating debt to non-owners
c. farmers still helping each other with ploughing, hence the idea to make 
owners pay may be difficult to implement
d. individuals with excess grazing may demand more than the agreed price
e. non-owners by not owning cattle are lazy, so why should they benefit from 
non-owners
f. outsiders would come in and buy shares
These responses shows that on implementing the policy, the community will have to 
decide on how payments for grazing would be done. For example, the community could 
agree that payment could be done in-kind in the form of "ploughing rights". Thus per 
grazing right sold, the cattle owner would plough y acres of the non-cattle owner as 
payment. With this sort of arrangement, problems (a) to (d) above would have been 
solved. For problem (f) the community will have to agree that no outsider would be 
allowed to buy grazing shares from the community.
3.2.2 Taxing the Communal Farmer
Another option that can be used to manage communal grazing is to tax the cattle owners. 
This can be done by making the cattle owners pay $X per animal per year for grazing. 
When this policy is implemented it will be important to inform the farmers on exactly why 
they have to pay the tax. Aiso of importance is that the tax be collected by local 
authorities and not by the state so that it can either be redistributed to non-cattle owners 
or be used in the development projects of the community or in managing and improving 
grazing.
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3.2.2.1 Efficiency implications
In theory, the tax system is supposed to result in efficient use of resources. With a 
perfectly functioning market, high demand for grazing will result in high taxes and low 
demand in low taxes. However, the tax system functions well as long as the tax levied on 
the livestock owners is enough to cover for grazing costs and externalities, otherwise a 
iower than optimal tax would result in inefficient use of grazing lands.
3.2.2.2 Equity implications
If the tax revenue collected is redistributed to non-cattle owners who do not directly 
benefit from the utilization of the grazing resources, it is equitable. If the tax revenue is 
used on other development projects, then the non-owners may benefit indirectly or may 
not benefit at all depending on who benefits from the projects. In this case the tax policy 
may not be equitable.
3.2.2.3 Sustainability implications
The tax system will result in less animals being grazed. This means stocking rates may 
be close to the carrying capacity of the veld. Thus the tax system would result in a more 
sustainable use of the veld. There would be need for authorities to see that there is no 
encroachment on the grazing lands for cultivation. Perhaps farmers will have to pay even 
higher taxes.
3.2.2.4 Food security implications
A priori the implications of the tax system on food security can not be spelled out. As 
outlined under the grazing rights, policy, the impact of the tax system on food security 
depends on whether increased the draught power and milk production due to the 
improved veld, outweighs the effects of more animals without veld improvement.
Unlike the grazing rights policy, farmers may not be obliged to plough for non-livestock 
owners. Given that there will be few animals available for draught,, it is mainly the 
livestock owners who may benefit from increased crop production due to the improved 
draught condition resulting from better veld management. In this case the inequality gap 
between cattle owners and non-owners may increase.
3.2.2.5 Problems in implementing the tax policy
As has been shown in the introduction to this paper, farmers resisted the cattle head tax. 
Trying to implement this policy may be politically sensitive, though it is clear this is one 
policy option that can result in efficient and sustainable use of grazing.
The other problem is that the system is open to corruption. The responsible authorities 
may misuse the tax revenue or some influential individuals may bribe the authorities so as 
not to pay. If this happens, the tax system ceases to-be efficient and sustainable.— ..—
3.2.3 individualization of Title: Leasehold
The National Farmer's Association of Zimbabwe (NFAZ) has argued for leasehold permits 
granting "the rights to occupy land on an individual basis, both on arable and grazing 
iand, on the ground that these will allow proper resource management through 
accountability in terms of observing the stipulated conditions of the permit (Cousins, 
1990). The argument put forward by the NFAZ is the individual title is essential for
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security and investment.
3.2.3.1 Efficiency implications
Due to, lack.of,security of.tenure this policy is inefficient. Farmers are likely to over-use 
the grazing under their control as much as they can before the lease comes to an end, 
and they will not pay for the damage done to the environment due to over-exploitation.
Efficiency also implies implementing a policy at least costs. If the lease policy have to 
ensure that the grazing lands are not over-exploited, responsible authorities will have'to 
ensure that enforceable standards for grazing are set. It is costly to enforce these 
standards and hence the individualization lease hold policy is likely to be inefficient.
3.2.3.2 Equity implications
Given the land use pattern in communal areas, i.e. opportunistic herding in spatially and 
temporally variable environments, at high stocking rates, it may be impossible to 
demarcate individual plots of sufficient size to accommodate the feed resources to 
sustain a draught-oriented herd of cattle,'without drastically reducing the number of 
households in the area. It is unlikely that all households in a community could be 
provided with grazing land-of high enough quality. That is an equity problem-would arise 
in the allocation of individually held grazing land.
On allocating land for grazing to individuals, if non-cattle owners are taken into 
consideration, the individualization leasehold policy would be equitable. Then the non­
cattle owners would lease their grazing to owners on an annual basis and generate a flow 
of income either in cash or in the,form of "ploughing rights", if the non-cattle owners are 
not considered the policy would be inequitable.
3.2.3.3 Sustainability implications
Due to lack of security of tenure, farmers will over-exploit the grazing areas under their 
control. The result is an unsustainable use of grazing resources.
3.2.3.4 Food security implications
With the lease hold policy food security may initially improve in the community due to the 
initial overuse of the veld. With time, as the veld condition deteriorates there would be a 
decrease in draught and milk output. Hence in the long run the food security of the 
communal farmers is threatened.
If some farmers decide to sell or lease their land holdings, they eventually become 
landless and this may exacerbate the food security situation in the communal areas.
3.2.3.5 Problems in implementing the individual title policy
As pointed out by Bruce (1986), individual title does not guarantee that the grazing land 
will not be subject to exploitation and degradation. One possible reason for overstocking 
is. where an individual holding is.too small to support enough cattle for breeding and 
draught. Thus this proposal may not be technically feasible under, conditions of high 
population pressure. With the anticipated land reform, this policy may be feasible.
3.2.4 Compensating coalitions
Compensating coalitions basically refers to a situation whereby the farmers form 
organized groups or cooperatives so that they can manage the grazing lands as a
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community (Wilson and Thompson, 1991). A brief theory for the compensation coalitions 
is given below and it is illustrated in Figure 2.
C represents the cooperative payoff to herder n+1 as more herders cooperate with the 
grazing plan. With few (<x) herders cooperating, the sacrifices made by herder n+1, such 
as herd size reduction and time managed grazing, are reflected in negative payoffs. 
Positive payoffs occur with increased cooperation. If all herders cooperate we reach an 
equilibrium at z. However, herders have an incentive to defect, that is they choose not to 
cooperate (NC). As more people choose to cooperate the payoffs to defect increase 
because the defecting herder does not have to reduce herd size or follow grazing 
guidelines, yet benefits from improved forage levels due to the actions of others. These 
increasing positive externalities for the defecting herder are reflected in the positively- 
sloped NC curve. NC is said to dominate C because NC payoffs exceed those of 
cooperators (the dominated strategy) at low levels of cooperation.
The payoff curve for cooperation reflects the degree of range improvement, and hence 
productivity, as more herders follow a coalition orja.grazing plan. Marginal payoffs to 
each additional herder are low at first but then increase at an increasing rate until a critical 
mass of herders join the cooperative group. Payoffs continue to increase with each 
additional cooperator but at a decreasing rate.,
NC continues to dominate at low levels of cooperation blit NC and C eventually .converge 
as more people choose to cooperate in the hope of reaching a Pareto equilibrium (z). At 
y the two payoff curves intersect with C becoming the dominant strategy. If the 
compensating coalition can reach a size y they can convince others to join because of the
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superior economic payoffs.4
3.2.4.1 Efficiency implications
This policy option is likely to works when the environment in most areas is very degraded. 
If successfully implemented, this policy option is, in theory, efficient as long as the 
number of people composing the community is small. This is basically because the costs 
of organizing group meetings and agreeing on the number of livestock to keep would be 
low. However, as the group size increases, the transaction costs increase and the policy 
may become inefficient. If this policy, is encouraged in the communal areas at village 
level, it may be easily implemented.
3.2.4.2 Equity implications
The effect of the policy on equity cannot be stated a priori. Veld improvement due to 
formation of a coalition results in improved animal weights which, ceteris paribus, results 
in improved draught and milk output. As long as there is a competitive market for these 
products, non-cattle owners would indirectly benefit from the resulting lower prices of milk 
and draught. However, if milk and draught are traded in an imperfect market, non-cattle 
owners may not.benefit from the coalition. Hence the coalition may not be equitable,___
3.2.4.3 Sustainability implications
Once the community have agreed to form a coalition, and at least y individuals in the 
community agrees to abide by the by-laws, it will enable the veld to regenerate and to be 
used sustainably.
3.2.4.4 Food security implications
The impact on food security are the same as for the grazing rights and tax policies. The 
impact will depend on whether increased draught power and milk production due to the 
improved veld, outweighs the effects of more animals without veld improvement. 
Whether the non-cattle owners would be food secure will depend on the existing market 
conditions.
3.3 Experiences From Other Countries
This section provides experiences from other countries concerning common property 
resource management with special reference to grazing. Some of the experiences can 
be used to define, complement and modify some of the policy options outlined above for 
the communal areas of Zimbabwe.
To reduce grassland degradation in the Yellow River delta in China, it was recommended 
that grazing be separated from cutting areas, controlling dates and intensity of grazing 
and reducing stocking rates (Li, 1989 -abstract). This policy may be a specificity that has 
to be followed for example under any of the policy options in section 3.2.
To overcome environmental degradation due to overgrazing in India one of the policy
The dotted lines for NC beyond y illustrate the hypothetical level of 
enforcement by cooperators on herders tempted to ignore the grating 
plan. But of course there is no economic incentive for herders to 
choose the NC option at or beyond this point.
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options was to control population growth (Pal, 1989 - abstract). Metz (1987) indicates that 
in West Nepal, with increasing human population, to overcome overgrazing, better 
conservation strategies and planting of fodder were encouraged. What may be 
appropriate for Zimbabwe, is the need to ensure that in the long run there is a relative 
decline in the majority of the rural population depending on land for a living through the 
development of rural industries.
Country experiences that show that individualization of holdings may not work are drawn 
from Kenya and Botswana. Experience in Kenya has shown that individualization can be 
a costly and time consuming process, and that the expected results of increased 
investment in agricultural production and rising incomes is by no means guaranteed. 
Fragmentation of households has not been effectively halted, and confusion have arisen 
because people continue to convey rights in land according to rules of customary law. 
Landlessness and increased insecurity for some have also resulted (Barrows and Roth, 
1989).
Botswana has attempted to overcome problems of grazing management by granting of 
individual leaseholds to commercial ranching areas on some parts of what was previously 
communal grazing. Again the results have not been the improvements in investment and 
productivity hoped for, and loss of rights of some groups and inequitable effects have 
been recognized as serious negative consequences (Lawry, 1983).
In the Aravalli Hills, Jawaja Block, Rajasthan in India, informal education centers were 
established where villagers could come together to discuss potential solutions to the 
problems they faced. Through these village discussions a consensus was reached to 
establish a large scale afforestationprogramme. The programme included a variety of 
safeguards to ensure equitable distribution of benefits (Dixon, James and Sherman (eds) 
1990 - abstract). This is an example where by establishing appropriate institutions, the 
community can actually come together and discuss solutions to its problems - a form of 
compensating coalitions.
Another area where compensating coalitions seem to work is in the Sami areas of 
Northern Norway, in this area management of common grazing has been successful 
through flexible social groupings which mediate the relation between the size of the herd 
and the capacity of the pasture. The fact there is no historical evidence of overgrazing in 
the Sami area shows that this management system is successful (Bjorklund, 1990 - 
abstract).
A case from Mexico shows the difficulties that may be encountered in the formation of 
compensating coalitions. Wilson and Thompson (1991) indicated that high transaction 
costs explain the difficulty for coalitions not reaching either y or z in Figure 2. These are 
the opportunity costs of achieving and maintaining assurance within a compensating 
coalition. Time to form coalitions may be a scarce resource. Institution building takes 
valuable hours and days away from activities which have a higher probability of producing 
income. Lack of political sophistication, technical knowledge and entrepreneurial ability 
on the part of herders are also critical components of these transaction costs. In addition, 
most herders are suspicious of cooperative programs. The authors also noted that 
cultural inertia is another transaction cost that may prevent the formation of coalitions.
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SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
The paper shows that the problem of overgrazing in the communal areas is due to 
historical developments, current government livestock development goals which are in 
conflict with farmers livestock production objectives and the multiple role of cattle in the 
communal areas which results in low off-take rates. Also of importance is the problems of 
tenure - property rights for communal area grazing are not defined.
Under the present grazing management in communal areas, externalities are not 
internalized by the decision making units thereby creating a situation of open access. 
Hardin's (1968) 'tragedy of the commons' concludes that individuals enjoy the benefits of 
the common property regime but the group pays the full cost of the individual's behavior. 
Since costs are not internalized by the individual herder, overgrazing is a rational decision 
in the short run, leading to the degradation of the range lands.
Under an open access regime, herd size, grazing routes and livestock mix are subject to 
individual objectives and constraints. Yet common property is defined as the co-equal 
ownership of the rights to a bounded resource where community-established rules govern 
its use. Therefore an institutional structure is essential to the definition of common 
property. Without it, common property cannot be differentiated from open access and 
resource degradation is inevitable. But with an institutional structure providing rules to 
regulate individual and group behavior, communal groups can cooperate successful for 
the benefit of the community and the Natural Resource.
The policy options that can be used to manage the communal area grazing resources 
and their implications on efficiency, equity, sustainability and food security are given. 
These policy options are the allocation of grazing rights, taxing the cattle owners, 
leasehold ownership of both arable and grazing and compensating coalitions.
The analysis shows that the grazing rights and coalition policies if well implemented, with 
the appropriate institutions in place, are efficient, and sustainable.
As the evidence from other countries show, it may be necessary or desirable to 
complement these policies by putting up informal education centers in the communal 
areas and producing fodder to supplement the veld. Also of importance is that as the 
population continues to grow, there is need to enhance rural industrialization to ease the 
pressure on land, so that the fragile environment of the communal areas are not further 
degraded.
In conclusion, the allocation of grazing rights policy or/and the compensating coalition 
policies are the potentially feasible policies that can be adopted to efficiently manage the 
grazing lands in the communal areas of Zimbabwe.
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